183_40 interference 40. The Court reiterates that an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities (see Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 100). It previously found that a disruption of a religious gathering which caused its premature termination amounted to a limitation on the right to freedom of religion (see Kuznetsov 10 DUBROVINA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT and Others v. Russia, no. 184/02, §§ 59-62, 11 January 2007) and, by implication, an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (ibid., § 53). In the present case, the applicants could not proceed with their small-scale informal gathering in the presence of the large number of police officers who were accusing them of a failure to notify the authorities of their meeting and who remained in the room until the participants of the meeting left it. It is clear that the meeting was brought to an end prematurely by the authorities’ intervention, which therefore constituted “a restriction”, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention.