### Foreseeability and Discretion
The Court has consistently emphasized the importance of foreseeability in the context of laws regulating public assemblies and the discretion granted to executive authorities. For a restriction on the freedom of assembly to be "prescribed by law," it must meet the requirement of foreseeability. This means that the law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to regulate their conduct and foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences of their actions (
615_21).
#Clear Guidance and Public Statements
The power to regulate assemblies in Trafalgar Square was found to be sufficiently clear due to public statements and numerous refusals of demonstrations, which provided precise guidance to individuals (
47_99,
47_100,
47_101).
#Discretion and Executive Statements
The Court has criticized domestic laws that grant excessively broad discretion to executive authorities, as this can lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. For instance, the manner in which the domestic authorities interpreted and applied the law on the notification and authorization of public assemblies did not provide protection against arbitrary interference (
183_43,
380_52,
405_15,
553_60).
- **Russia**: The Court criticized the lack of a legally binding time frame for authorities to give final decisions on public events, which rendered judicial remedies ineffective and failed the foreseeability requirement (
227_13,
227_14).
- **Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement**: The general ban on holding public events near court buildings was found to be too broadly drawn to be foreseeable (
405_15).
- **Excessive Discretion**: The Court has previously asserted that domestic law granted excessively broad discretion to executive authorities in proposing changes to the location of public events, often leading to arbitrary and discriminatory use of these powers. This lack of precision and clarity in the law fails the foreseeability requirement (
553_60).
#Criminal Code Provisions
The Court examined the foreseeability of a provision in the Criminal Code that penalizes individuals who prevent the lawful exercise of freedom to assemble or demonstrate, or who seriously disturb the proceedings of a lawful assembly or demonstration. The provision specifies different penalties depending on whether the acts were perpetrated with violence or by illegal means, providing a clear legal basis and making the consequences of such actions foreseeable (
615_21).