### Foreseeability and Quality of Law

#General Principles

1. **Definition and Purpose**:
- The term "prescribed by law" requires that the measure in question has a basis in domestic law and that the law is accessible and foreseeable in its effects. This means the law must be precise enough to enable individuals to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences of their actions and regulate their conduct accordingly (53_135, 58_104, 58_105, 58_106, 183_43, 191_8, 196_72, 235_39, 336_66, 357_22, 360_30, 380_38, 440_23, 536_17, 553_60, 594_101).
- Absolute precision in laws is unattainable, especially in evolving societal fields. Many laws are inevitably vague, and their interpretation and application are questions of practice (357_22, 380_41).
- National courts play a crucial role in clarifying any remaining interpretational doubts, and the ECtHR's review ensures that such interpretations are compatible with the Convention (357_22, 380_42).

2. **Quality of Law**:
- The law must be clear enough to give individuals an adequate indication of the circumstances and conditions under which public authorities can interfere with their rights (336_66, 360_30, 380_40).
- The "quality of the law" requires compatibility with the rule of law, implying adequate safeguards against arbitrary interferences by public authorities (380_38, 380_39, 440_23, 553_60).

3. **Foreseeability Requirement**:
- For a restriction on the freedom of assembly to be "prescribed by law," it must meet the foreseeability requirement. This means the law must be precise enough to enable individuals to regulate their conduct and foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences of their actions (536_17, 553_60, 594_101, 615_21).

#Applications

1. **Clear Legal Basis and Precision**:
- The Court has found that some legal provisions were sufficiently precise and foreseeable. For instance, the interference was prescribed by law and pursued legitimate aims in the case of the applicant's conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the CC and section 5 of the Law on the Prevention of Terrorism (337_23).
- It should have been foreseeable to participants in non-approved events that failure to comply with police orders could lead to prosecution (336_70).
- The administrative penalty for using profane language during a demonstration was foreseeable, as the relevant provision explicitly prohibited such language in public, and the applicants acknowledged their conduct would entail administrative liability (432_39).
- The ban on public events near court buildings was based on section 8(1) of the Assembly Act, considered prescribed by law (429_18).
- Section 2(3) of Georgian Law provided for restrictions on the right to assembly based on legitimate aims such as protecting national security, public safety, and the rights of others. The law required that any interference be based on law, necessary in a democratic society, non-discriminatory, and proportionate (594_101).
- In a case involving the applicant's arrest at a demonstration and subsequent conviction of administrative offenses, the interference was "prescribed by law" as it was based on Article 173 of the CAO, pursuing the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others (598_54).

2. **Lack of Clear Legal Basis**:
- The Court identified instances where legislation was not sufficiently foreseeable. For example, Article 220 § 6 of the Turkish Penal Code was not foreseeable in its application, lacking legal protection against arbitrary interference (305_12).
- Concerns about the foreseeability and precision of legislation governing public assemblies were noted in multiple cases, such as Gafgaz Mammadov (312_51, 348_37, 368_115, 380_52).
- The Public Events Act's prohibition of public gatherings near court buildings did not meet the quality of law requirement due to its broad nature and the wide discretion given to local authorities (405_15).
- The national law lacked procedures for resolving conflicts between the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and the rights of others, leading to discrepancies and a lack of foreseeability (440_26).
- Domestic courts did not clarify which expressions amounted to "campaigning" versus "informing," leading to a lack of foreseeability regarding breaches of the law (466_80).
- Domestic law granted excessively broad discretion to executive authorities in proposing changes to the location of public events, often leading to arbitrary and discriminatory use of these powers, failing the foreseeability requirement (553_60).

3. **Discretion and Executive Statements**:
- The Court criticized domestic laws granting excessively broad discretion to executive authorities, leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. For instance, the interpretation and application of the law on public assemblies did not protect against arbitrary interference (380_52).
- The general ban on holding public events near court buildings was too broadly drawn to be foreseeable (405_15).

4. **Vague Provisions**:
- Certain legal provisions were too vague to meet the foreseeability requirement. For example, prohibitions listed in paragraph 4 of section 6 of the Public Events Act were not applicable and were not breached by the applicant, indicating a lack of clarity (336_68).

5. **Specific Cases**:
- In the case of the applicant's conviction under Article 310.1 of the CAO, the legislation did not meet the foreseeability requirement, as the authorities failed to consider that the demonstration had been notified and conducted peacefully (348_33, 348_37).
- Domestic courts failed to assess the lawfulness of decisions to refuse to authorize assemblies, endorsing the authorities' reasons without addressing the applicants' arguments about the arbitrariness of the refusals (380_51).
- In a case where applicants were prosecuted under Article 20.2 of the CAO for non-compliance with a police order to disperse, the Court left open the question of whether it was foreseeable that they would be prosecuted in separate proceedings for a separate non-approved demonstration (536_17).

6. **Foreseeability and Legitimate Aims**:
- The Court examined specific legal provisions restricting the right to freedom of assembly, ensuring they were based on legitimate aims and necessary in a democratic society. However, the laws must still meet the foreseeability requirement (301_23, 362_23).

7. **Practical Compliance with the Law**:
- The Court scrutinized municipal decisions to ensure compliance with the foreseeability requirement. For instance, the authorities' failure to present evidence of unsurmountable obstacles to holding an assembly indicated a lack of foreseeability (380_49).
- In a case involving the dispersal of a demonstration, participants were adequately informed about the dispersal through repeated megaphone announcements, ensuring they could foresee the consequences of not complying with police orders (449_21).

8. **Judicial Clarifications**:
- While judicial clarifications, such as those provided by the Supreme Court, are welcome, further measures are necessary to address general issues related to the foreseeability of laws governing public assemblies (553_60).

9. **Failure to Meet Quality of Law Requirements**:
- The Court concluded that interference with the applicant’s freedom of assembly was based on legal provisions that did not meet the Convention’s quality of law requirements, indicating a lack of foreseeability (293_9, 466_50).

10. **Criminal Code Provisions**:
- The Court examined the foreseeability of a Criminal Code provision penalizing individuals who prevent the lawful exercise of freedom to assemble or demonstrate, or who seriously disturb the proceedings of a lawful assembly or demonstration. The provision specifies different penalties depending on whether the acts were perpetrated with violence or by illegal means, providing a clear legal basis and making the consequences foreseeable (615_21).